Can 'more speech' counter ignorant speech? by Lepoutre, Maxime Charles




Creative Commons: Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 
Open Access 
Lepoutre, M. C. (2019) Can 'more speech' counter ignorant 
speech? Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, 16 (3). ISSN 
1559-3061 doi: https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v16i3.682 
Available at http://centaur.reading.ac.uk/96656/ 
It is advisable to refer to the publisher’s version if you intend to cite from the 
work.  See Guidance on citing .
Identification Number/DOI: https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v16i3.682 
<https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v16i3.682> 
Publisher: University of Southern California 
All outputs in CentAUR are protected by Intellectual Property Rights law, 
including copyright law. Copyright and IPR is retained by the creators or other 
copyright holders. Terms and conditions for use of this material are defined in 
the End User Agreement . 
www.reading.ac.uk/centaur 
CentAUR 
Central Archive at the University of Reading 
Reading’s research outputs online
Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v16i3.682
Vol. 16, No. 3 · December 2019 © 2019 Author
155
CAN “MORE SPEECH” COUNTER 
IGNORANT SPEECH?
Maxime Lepoutre
emocratic public discourse is rife with ignorant speech—speech 
that disseminates or promotes falsehoods. Some of this speech comes 
from speakers who are themselves ignorant and believe the falsehoods 
they utter. Very often, however, the sources of ignorant speech, as defined above, 
are not themselves ignorant; rather, they knowingly spread ignorant views and 
perspectives for personal or political gain. 
Ignorant speech is a very broad class. It can spread many different kinds of 
falsehoods that bear on many different kinds of things. But two species of igno-
rant speech are particularly noteworthy, as they have proven to be particularly 
dangerous in contemporary democracies. The first consists in ordinary political 
misinformation, where speakers circulate falsehoods concerning policy-relat-
ed issues. Whether it is bloggers claiming that the MMR vaccine causes autism, 
senior politicians asserting that Obamacare would implement life-threatening 
“death panels,” or public figures insisting that exiting the European Union would 
save the United Kingdom (and its National Health Service) £350 million a week, 
there is no doubt that policy debates are rife with such misinformation.1
The second noteworthy category spreads falsehoods not about policies but 
about people. Specifically, this species of ignorant speech, which constitutes 
a type of hate speech, puts forward representations of other social groups that 
falsely deny their basic equality—often by advancing vilifying or degrading 
characterizations of them. A paradigmatic illustration here is speech that acti-
vates distorted stereotypes that present minorities as essentially subhuman or 
morally inferior: for instance, that refugees are “a plague” of “cockroaches,” that 
Muslims are terrorists, or that Mexican immigrants are “criminals” and “rapists.”2
The pervasiveness of these two forms of ignorant speech constitutes a serious 
1 Godlee, Smith, and Marcovitch, “Wakefield’s Article Linking MMR Vaccine and Autism Was 
Fraudulent”; Holan, “PolitiFact’s Lie of the Year”; Sparrow, “UK Statistics Chief Says Vote 
Leave £350m Figure Is Misleading.”
2 Nelson, “Katie Hopkins Reflects on Branding Migrants ‘Cockroaches’ and ‘Feral Humans’”; 
D
156 Lepoutre
political problem: policy misinformation and hateful forms of ignorant speech, 
it has been argued, are both liable to generate grave injustices. The former risks 
misleading the public into supporting unjust policies or harmful candidates.3 As 
for the latter, it is capable of producing a wide array of unjust harms, such as 
inciting animosity, causing psychological trauma, undermining targets’ sense of 
dignity, subordinating targets, or enacting discriminatory norms.4 
A celebrated response to this problem recommends countering ignorant 
utterances with informed and truthful speech. This is of course familiar from 
debates in democratic theory: “deliberative” theorists of democracy have long 
advocated inclusive deliberation, and have increasingly done so on epistemic 
grounds. On their view, exchanging arguments, voicing personal narratives, and 
soliciting expert testimony are powerful ways of debunking political misinfor-
mation and thus correcting false political beliefs.5
This response is not specific to ordinary political misinformation: “coun-
terspeech” is also an extremely popular remedy for hateful forms of ignorant 
speech. In particular, opponents of legal restrictions on hate speech typically in-
sist that we should counter hate speech verbally rather than legally.6 In this con-
text, counterspeech involves contesting the distorted contents that hate speech 
asserts, presupposes, or encodes, so as to block whatever harms their diffusion 
would otherwise give rise to.
Despite this popularity, the counterspeech response to ignorant speech has 
come under heavy criticism, especially in the context of hate speech. According 
to one influential objection, advocating counterspeech as the remedy for hate 
speech is unfair, as it “places the burden of the remedy on those targeted (and 
potentially harmed) by the allegedly harmful speech.”7 Relatedly, others have 
worried that, because it demands too much of targets of hate speech, counter-
speech also risks being ineffective. For one thing, there is evidence that targets 
Asser, “What the Muhammad Cartoons Portray”; Reilly, “Here Are All the Times Donald 
Trump Insulted Mexico.”
3 Brown, “Propaganda, Misinformation, and the Epistemic Value of Democracy.”
4 Delgado, “Words that Wound”; Waldron, The Harm in Hate Speech; Maitra, “Subordinating 
Speech”; McGowan, Just Words, ch. 7.
5 See, e.g., Young, Inclusion and Democracy, chs. 1–3; Anderson, “The Epistemology of De-
mocracy”; and Landemore, Democratic Reason.
6 See, e.g., Louis Brandeis’s opinion in Whitney v. California (274 U.S. 357 (1927)); Post, Con-
stitutional Domains; Brettschneider, When the State Speaks, What Should It Say? ch. 3; Lep-
outre, “Hate Speech in Public Discourse”; and Strossen, Hate, ch. 8.
7 McGowan, “Responding to Harmful Speech,” 183. See also Maitra and McGowan, “Intro-
duction and Overview,” 9.
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rarely respond to such speech.8 And even if targets did speak back, they may lack 
the authority needed to do so in an effective or compelling way. This is both be-
cause targets generally belong to relatively vulnerable social groups, and because, 
as feminist philosophers of language have argued, hate speech can itself disable 
(or “silence”) its targets’ speech.9
However, these two preliminary concerns are not decisive. According to an 
increasing range of defenders of counterspeech, counterspeech can be thought 
of as a state-driven practice, rather than as something merely to be performed 
by private individuals. On this understanding, which Corey Brettschneider and 
Katharine Gelber have prominently articulated, it is primarily, though not ex-
clusively, the state’s responsibility to speak out against hate speech. The state has 
numerous tools for doing this, such as having high-profile politicians denounce 
vilifying utterances, designing school syllabuses, erecting historical monuments, 
or funding civil rights groups to challenge hate speakers.10 
This adjusted conception of who should engage in counterspeech seems a 
promising way of alleviating the two concerns outlined above. Recommending 
state-sponsored counterspeech is less unfair, as it shifts the burden of respond-
ing away from targets of hate speech. Moreover, the state is more likely than vul-
nerable targets to have the authority needed to be taken seriously when it oppos-
es hate speech.
But even with this adjustment, the policy of countering ignorant speech with 
more speech still encounters a deep problem. In her influential discussion of 
oppressive speech, Mary Kate McGowan has argued that the counterspeech re-
sponse operates with a naive conception of how language works. In particular, 
it overlooks the asymmetric pliability of conversational norms—the phenom-
enon whereby it is easier to enact conversational norms than it is subsequently 
to undo those norms. Because of this phenomenon, the damaging effects of ig-
norant speech on public discourse are difficult to reverse, or “sticky.” According-
ly, McGowan concludes, trying to undo the harmful effects of ignorant speech 
through more speech seems as futile as trying to “unring a bell.”11
Crucially, this problem of stickiness stems from facts about the dynamics of 
8 Nielsen, “Power in Public.”
9 On the authority problem and silencing, see Maitra and McGowan, “Introduction and 
Overview,” 10; McGowan, “Responding to Harmful Speech,” 183–84; Langton, “Speech 
Acts and Unspeakable Acts.” For a positive account of the authority requirement needed to 
successfully challenge hate speech, see Barnes, “Speaking with (Subordinating) Authority,” 
251–56.
10 Brettschneider, When the State Speaks, What Should It Say?; Gelber, “Reconceptualizing 
Counterspeech in Hate Speech Policy (with a Focus on Australia).”
11 McGowan, “Oppressive Speech,” 403.
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language and conversational norms, rather than about who is doing the talking. 
Prima facie, then, it is just as applicable to state counterspeech as to non-state 
counterspeech. In fact, as we will see, there are reasons to think that it is especially 
problematic for state-driven counterspeech. What this means is that an increas-
ingly popular way of defending counterspeech against criticism—namely, focus-
ing on state-driven counterspeech—will not help with this problem. 
In this article, I will examine the stickiness of ignorant speech more closely, 
with two aims. The first is to show that the asymmetric pliability of conversation-
al norms is an even more general problem than McGowan suggests, and that, as 
a result, it stands in the way of verbally countering both hateful and non-hateful 
forms of ignorant speech. The second is to articulate a more sophisticated ac-
count of counterspeech, which is distinctively suited to overcoming this prob-
lem. Doing so will help us arrive at a normative ideal of public discourse that is 
more finely attuned to nonideal conditions.
My argument will proceed as follows. After introducing the problem of stick-
iness, I demonstrate that it is a very general phenomenon, which applies not just 
to the oppressive or hateful speech that McGowan analyzes, but also to ordinary 
political misinformation (section 1). I then develop a conception of counter-
speech that is directly informed by this difficulty. Specifically, I argue that, by 
distinguishing between positive and negative forms of counterspeech (section 
2) and adopting a more nuanced view of counterspeech’s temporality (section 
3), we can substantially mitigate the problems generated by sticky ignorance. I 
conclude by examining the implications of this argument for legal responses to 
ignorant speech (section 4). 
Before proceeding, two important clarifications are in order. First, note that 
my purpose here is not to conclude that counterspeech is a sufficient remedy for 
ignorant speech, so that legal responses to such speech—such as bans on hate 
speech or on fake news—are unwarranted. I will be exploring and challenging 
a specific argument against counterspeech. But this does not necessarily entail 
opposing legal remedies. To begin, there might be other, as yet uncanvassed, 
problems for counterspeech. Moreover, my argument should also be useful to 
those who defend legal remedies. Many proponents of legal remedies accept 
that counterspeech nonetheless also has a role to play in combatting hateful or 
deceptive speech.12 To determine what the division of labor should be between 
legal and speech-based remedies, such theorists need to determine more pre-
cisely what problems are faced by counterspeech but avoided by bans. As will 
become apparent in section 4, my argument will advance this understanding: in 
12 E.g., Gelber, “Reconceptualizing Counterspeech in Hate Speech Policy (with a Focus on 
Australia),” 214; Langton, “Blocking as Counterspeech.”
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suggesting that a revised conception of counterspeech can substantially weak-
en the stickiness of ignorant speech, I am debunking one hypothesis regarding 
what legal remedies can do that counterspeech cannot. 
Second, we should pause to examine the appropriateness of considering hate 
speech and political misinformation together under the heading of ignorant 
speech. One might be wary of doing so on various grounds. For one thing, one 
might point out that not all hate speech involves disseminating or promoting 
falsehoods. In particular, some instances of hate speech attack vulnerable groups 
via utterances that are true (the leader of a racist party who shouts “We want you 
out!”), while other instances of hate speech, like imperatives, are not truth-apt 
(“Get out of this country!”). Thus, strictly speaking, these types of hate speech 
do not count as ignorant speech, as I define it.
Because my focus is on how we might verbally counter speech that produc-
es injustice or harms in virtue of spreading or promoting falsehoods, I will be 
bracketing these further types of hate speech for the purposes of this paper. That 
is, by “hate speech,” I will largely be talking about speech that puts forward rep-
resentations of its targets that incorrectly deny their basic equality (such as racist 
or xenophobic stereotypes that present their targets as essentially degraded or 
vile). While this constitutes a limit to the scope of my counterspeech-related 
recommendations, it does not render that scope insignificant: after all, an im-
portant portion of hate speech does produce bad effects (e.g., psychological dis-
tress, damage to targets’ dignity, stirring up animosity) by broadcasting distort-
ed equality-denying stereotypes.13
Still, even with this qualification, one might think that hateful and non-hate-
ful forms of ignorant speech remain importantly different: as discussed above, 
their dissemination of falsehoods may well generate harms or injustices in differ-
ent ways. Political misinformation typically does so by instilling false beliefs in 
listeners, which in turn may induce them to embrace unjust policies or danger-
ous candidates. Although speech that describes vulnerable groups in degrading 
ways may also induce false beliefs, this is far from the only way in which it can 
produce injustice: to reiterate, publicizing such hateful representations can also, 
among other things, assault its targets’ dignity, subordinate them, or enact dis-
criminatory norms.
13 What is the payoff of this restriction? As I will explain below, part of my aim in considering 
political misinformation alongside hate speech is to bring the rich philosophical analyses 
of conversational stickiness developed in the context of hateful speech to bear on our un-
derstanding of political misinformation. With this aim in mind, it makes sense to restrict 
my attention to cases of hate speech that are closer in form to political misinformation, in 
that—qua ignorant speech—they involve spreading or promoting falsehoods. 
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I do not wish to minimize this difference. My point is rather that, neverthe-
less, hateful and non-hateful forms of ignorant speech remain similar in at least 
one important way: as I will explain in section 1, their damaging conversational 
effects are “sticky,” in a way that makes them difficult to rebut via counterspeech. 
And, when exploring this similarity in section 1.2, I will consider how it may be 
complicated by the fact that hateful and non-hateful forms of ignorant speech 
produce harms or injustices via different mechanisms.
This similarity is important, and reveals why it is fruitful to consider hateful 
and non-hateful forms of ignorant speech side by side. On the one hand, the 
rich theoretical insights that philosophers of language such as McGowan have 
developed when thinking about the stickiness of hateful speech can help us un-
derstand why and when policy-related misinformation may also be resistant to 
counterspeech. Because they have traditionally been insensitive to this sticki-
ness, democratic theories that advocate policy-related deliberation would par-
ticularly benefit from these insights. But the fruitful relationship also goes in the 
other direction. Social psychologists have conducted numerous experiments on 
political misinformation and its correction. Insofar as hateful and non-hateful 
ignorant speech involve a similar kind of stickiness, this empirical evidence can, 
I will suggest, inform our verbal responses to hateful as well as non-hateful igno-
rant speech. 
1. The Stickiness of Ignorant Speech
1.1. The Asymmetric Pliability of Conversational Norms
Utterances can affect and alter conversations in countless ways. Among many 
other things, they can share new information (or bring it into the “common 
ground”); they can call accepted views into question; they can introduce new 
hypotheses or ideas, thereby making them more salient or relevant to the con-
versation; and they can explicitly invoke new conversational standards or rules. 
Whenever utterances do one of these things, they alter the norms that gov-
ern the conversation. This is clearest in the case of speech that explicitly invokes 
a new rule for the conversation with the intention of enacting it. Suppose a 
classroom participant says, “From now on, people must raise their hand before 
speaking.” Provided the speaker has sufficient authority (she is the instructor, 
rather than an overzealous auditor), her utterance can enact a new conversation-
al norm—namely, the norm that people must raise their hand before speaking.14
However, this is only a special case of how utterances alter conversational 
14 McGowan, “Oppressive Speech,” 393–94.
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norms. As McGowan has shown, even contributions that neither explicitly in-
voke nor intend to enact norms nonetheless alter the norms that govern the con-
versation. When an utterance shares new information, for instance, this makes it 
more permissible for subsequent utterances to presuppose that information. For 
example, it is more conversationally appropriate for A and B to discuss where 
the ceremony is taking place after they have told their interlocutors that they are 
getting married. Similarly, making a new hypothesis salient partly changes the 
topic of the conversation: that hypothesis becomes relevant to the conversation, 
so that participants can appeal to it without seeming out of line. If police officers 
investigating the disappearance of Sheriff Smith’s hat are listing known thieves, 
mentioning Deputy Jones (who is not a known thief) would seem inappropriate. 
But doing so becomes more conversationally appropriate if a participant raises 
the possibility that the theft was an inside job. McGowan’s general point, then, is 
that “our utterances routinely change what is permissible around us.”15
But even if utterances routinely change conversational norms, not all norm 
changes are equally easy to bring about. In particular, some norms are easier to 
introduce than to reverse. More specifically, alongside other philosophers of lan-
guage, McGowan suggests that the norms enacted by oppressive speech (such 
as hate speech) are “especially difficult to undo.”16 To illustrate this asymmetry, 
imagine that a public figure asserts “Xs are lazy parasites.” Verbally countering 
this assertion—for instance, by saying “That’s false! Xs are not lazy parasites!”—
may well be ineffective at reversing the initial utterance’s nefarious conversation-
al effects. Intuitively, negating the vilifying proposition in this way would only 
strengthen its conversational relevance: whether or not Xs are lazy parasites 
would become even more clearly the topic of conversation and, consequently, 
the social standing of Xs would be even more evidently at issue. On the basis of 
cases like these, McGowan hypothesizes that the norms introduced by oppres-
sive speech are asymmetrically pliable—verbally introducing them is easier than 
verbally reversing them. 
Elaborating on McGowan’s hypothesis, Robert Simpson has argued that the 
asymmetric pliability of the norms enacted by oppressive or hateful speech re-
sults from a more general asymmetry, which concerns salience. Generally speak-
ing, while we can easily make an association salient by mentioning it and draw-
15 McGowan, “Oppressive Speech,” 406; see also 394–97.
16 McGowan, “Responding to Harmful Speech,” 189; see also “Oppressive Speech,” 403. Mc-
Gowan is building on Lewis’s (“Scorekeeping in a Language Game”) observation that rais-
ing the standards for using vague terms like “flat” is easier than lowering them. Stanley (How 
Propaganda Works, 157–61) and Langton (“Blocking as Counterspeech,” sec. 6) echo the 
point that oppressive conversational norm changes are harder to reverse.
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ing people’s attention to it, it is much more difficult subsequently to make it less 
salient.17 This is because rejecting an association may inadvertently make one’s 
interlocutors pay even more attention to it.
This salience-based asymmetry helps explain why the distorted representa-
tions advanced by oppressive hate speech are so resistant to counterspeech. The 
initial utterance makes a vilifying association salient to listeners (say, between 
being an X and being a lazy parasite). This increased salience adjusts the bounds 
of the conversation, so that the hateful association becomes relevant to it. In 
other words, by making this association salient, the hateful utterance introduces 
the following conversational norm: it makes it more permissible for people sub-
sequently to debate whether or not Xs are in fact lazy parasites. In this context, 
trying to repudiate the association risks amplifying its salience and thereby re-
inforcing the conversational norm initially introduced.18 That is, exclaiming “Xs 
are not lazy parasites!” may challenge the claim that Xs are parasites. But even 
as it does so, it risks magnifying the salience of this stereotype within the con-
versation. And, in turn, saliently denying the vilifying stereotype reinforces its 
centrality as a topic of debate: it implicitly reaffirms the harmful norm that it is 
permissible publicly to discuss whether or not Xs are lazy parasites.19 
In sum, the distinctive properties of conversational salience make the harm-
ful effects of hateful speech sticky, in that they are more difficult to reverse than 
to enact. The natural response to this problem is pessimism about counterspeech. 
McGowan, as mentioned earlier, famously concludes that counterspeech is as 
futile as “trying to unring a bell.”20 Just as trying to unring a bell is likely to make 
it ring even more loudly, so trying to reverse the effects of hateful speech may 
simply amplify those effects. Simpson likewise expresses pessimism: for acti-
vated associations “to become un-salient,” he observes, “we will simply have to 
change the subject . . . or allow time to elapse.”21
Importantly, this problem is especially worrisome given how the policy of 
17 Simpson, “Un-Ringing the Bell,” 572. 
18 Simpson, “Un-Ringing the Bell,” 569–70. While McGowan and Simpson focus on oppres-
sive speech generally, this phenomenon also arises in more specific debates. When discuss-
ing hate speech that takes a coded form, Stanley (How Propaganda Works, 159) worries that 
verbally countering such speech requires exposing the code, and thereby raising the salience 
of its hateful contents. Moreover, examinations of slurs have shown that slur terms preserve 
their bad effects even when they are negated: “A is not an X” (e.g., Langton et al., “Language 
and Race,” 756–57). Here, too, salience may have an explanatory role: negating a slur in-
volves repeating it, which increases the salience of the degrading stereotype it expresses.
19 In section 1.2, I explain in greater detail why this conversational norm is harmful.
20 McGowan, “Oppressive Speech,” 403. 
21 Simpson, “Un-Ringing the Bell,” 569. 
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countering hateful speech with more speech has recently been defended. As 
discussed above, in response to concerns regarding the fairness and authority 
of counterspeech, its proponents have increasingly argued that counterspeech 
should primarily be performed by the state. However, we can now see that em-
bracing state-driven counterspeech does not alleviate the stickiness problem. 
If anything, it worsens it. In virtue of being highly authoritative, state speech 
is capable of significantly influencing the norms of public discourse on a large 
scale. Precisely because state speech is so powerful, what the state says is typi-
cally highly salient. What this means, however, is that having the state repudiate 
vilifying representations risks increasing their salience all the more. Thus, the 
objection under consideration is so problematic for state-driven counterspeech 
because it works by harnessing the power of counterspeech against it: since the 
state has an unparalleled ability to set the agenda of public discourse, it also has 
an unparalleled tendency to strengthen the salience of vilifying representations 
when challenging them.
1.2. Generalizing the Objection
Philosophers have almost exclusively discussed the problem of stickiness with-
in debates about oppressive speech or hate speech—i.e., speech that casts its 
targets as fundamentally inferior.22 But the linguistic phenomenon that under-
pins this problem is quite general. To see this, recall that, according to Simpson’s 
analysis, the difficulty of reversing the conversational norms enacted by oppres-
sive speech is partly explained by the fact that it is easier to make an association 
salient than unsalient. Now, this asymmetry is not inherently sensitive to the 
specific content of the association.23 It stems from properties of salience, and 
any content can in principle be salient. Accordingly, the salience-related asym-
metry Simpson identifies applies not simply to hateful stereotypes, but also to 
associations that spread misinformation about policy. 
As a result, it is also true of counterspeech directed at policy misinformation 
that it risks amplifying rather than reversing the salience of its target utterance. 
This observation is fairly intuitive. The more the Centers for Disease Control 
(CDC) asserts that “vaccines do not cause autism,” the more conversationally sa-
lient the misleading association between vaccines and autism risks becoming.24 
22 Simpson does briefly note when concluding that the asymmetric pliability of conversational 
norms may apply beyond the context of oppressive speech (“Un-Ringing the Bell,” 572–74). 
But his purpose in doing so is not to establish that ordinary political misinformation, specif-
ically, can be sticky; and his focus in the vast majority of the paper is on oppressive speech. 
23 Simpson, “Un-Ringing the Bell,” 573.
24 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “Vaccines Do Not Cause Autism.”
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Similarly, insisting, as the anti-Brexit “Remain” campaign did, that the UK did 
not send the EU £350 million each week, risked drawing attention to that ru-
mor.25 The point, then, is that insofar as the problem of stickiness results from a 
general salience-based asymmetry, we have every reason to think that this phe-
nomenon applies to ordinary political misinformation as well. 
But more needs to be said. So far, I have suggested that, as with hateful forms 
of ignorant speech, it is easier to make the associations advanced by ordinary po-
litical misinformation salient than unsalient. The second step is to suggest that 
the salience of political misinformation is connected to its morally problematic 
effects. Indeed, unless this second step holds, a skeptic might raise the following 
concern: “Even if it is hard to make political misinformation unsalient through 
counterspeech, this is not morally problematic. After all, the potential harm-
ful or unjust effects of political misinformation are not strongly connected to, 
and do not readily ensue from, the mere salience of misinformation. So, even if 
counterspeech exacerbates the salience of misinformation, it might nevertheless 
succeed in discrediting it and disabling its harmful conversational effects.” To es-
tablish that the salience-based asymmetry Simpson diagnoses truly is a problem 
for countering political misinformation with more speech, we must therefore 
identify a meaningful connection between the salience of misinformation and 
its harmful or unjust conversational effects. 
Now, because hateful and non-hateful forms of ignorant speech lead to harms 
or injustices in different ways (and very likely to a different extent), the specific 
answer we give to this second question is likely to differ from the answer we give 
in the case of hateful forms of ignorant speech. In the case of hate speech, Jeremy 
Waldron has powerfully argued that there exists a tight, constitutive connection 
between conversational salience and injustice. According to Waldron, justice re-
quires that citizens be assured of their standing as social and political equals.26 
Indeed, unless it is visible to citizens that they can count on having their rights as 
equal members of society respected, they will be unable to participate in social 
and political life without fear.27 The problem with hate speech, Waldron empha-
sizes, is that the mere salience of its vilifying contents in public debate threatens 
to undermine this very assurance. 
To see why, remember that what it means for something to be conversation-
ally salient is that it is relevant to the conversation, or included within the top-
ic of conversation. It is, in other words, partly what the conversation is about. 
Consequently, when a vilifying stereotype is salient in public debate, this means 
25 Sparrow, “UK Statistics Chief Says Vote Leave £350m Figure Is Misleading.”
26 Waldron, The Harm in Hate Speech, ch. 4.
27 Waldron, The Harm in Hate Speech, 85.
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that the public conversation is about whether its contents are accurate. What is 
at issue in the conversation, then, is whether or not, say, women are submissive, 
blacks are subhuman, or immigrants are parasites. Since these propositions are 
clearly inconsistent with the good status of the targeted groups, these groups 
are no longer assured of their good standing. Instead, their standing is precisely 
what is at issue in public debate. Therefore, it is clearly problematic if counter-
speech reinforces the conversational salience of hate speech: the mere salience 
of hateful representations constitutes an injustice.
This, however, does not seem to be the case with ordinary political misinfor-
mation. Unlike with vilifying stereotypes, the fact that a falsehood about policy 
matters is at issue does not inherently constitute an injustice. Indeed, that there 
is a debate about whether MMR vaccines cause autism does not in and of itself 
call anyone’s standing into question. So, if the salience of ordinary political mis-
information is not harmful or unjust in the same way that the salience of hate 
speech is, what nevertheless makes this salience morally problematic?
In answering this question, philosophers can benefit from contemporary 
advances in cognitive science. Cognitive scientists have shown that there is an 
intimate connection between the cognitive fluency of an association—roughly, 
how familiar one is with that association—and one’s disposition to believe it. As 
Lewandowsky et al. summarize, “in general, fluently processed information . . . is 
more likely to be accepted as true.”28
This finding helps appreciate what is problematic about the conversational 
salience of political misinformation. When an association is made conversation-
ally salient, that association is thereby activated for participants: because the 
association is newly relevant to the conversation, their attention is drawn to it, 
and they are prone to represent it. Thus, the salience of an association is tightly 
linked to participants’ cognitive familiarity, or fluency, with it. If, as cognitive 
scientists argue, the fluency of an association in turn disposes people to believe 
it, then the problem becomes manifest. The conversational salience of ordinary 
political misinformation is problematic because it increases the likelihood that 
participants will accept the misinformation. And this, in turn, is plausibly caus-
ally related to harm and injustice. Insofar as political misinformation conceals 
the vices of dangerous policies and candidates, and obscures the virtues of good 
policies and candidates, the salience-induced acceptance of misinformation may 
help produce injustice. 
The upshot for counterspeech directed at ordinary political misinformation 
28 Lewandowsky et al., “Misinformation and Its Correction,” 212. See also Alter and Oppen-
heimer, “Uniting the Tribes of Fluency to Form a Metacognitive Nation,” 228; and Berinsky, 
“Rumors and Health Care Reform,” 245–47.
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is troubling: insofar as countering misinformation with more speech magnifies 
its salience, doing so risks bolstering people’s disposition to accept the target-
ed misinformation, together with the attending dangerous consequences. This 
worry is not merely theoretical. Social psychologists have widely reported a 
“continued influence effect,” whereby attempting verbally to correct falsehoods 
is ineffective or worse.29 In one study, CDC flyers distinguishing myths from facts 
about vaccines are shown to backfire: people who have read the flyer end up be-
ing more likely to misidentify myths as facts—and to oppose vaccination—than 
people who have not.30 Similarly, Adam Berinsky finds that, although rehearsing 
and correcting the Obamacare death-panel rumors initially makes people some-
what more likely to reject those rumors, this effect largely disappears after a few 
weeks.31
Thus, the problem of stickiness applies not merely to hateful forms of igno-
rant speech, but also to political misinformation. As we have seen, there are two 
steps to establishing this generalization: first, as with hateful forms of ignorant 
speech, it is easier to increase the conversational salience of political misinfor-
mation than it is subsequently to reverse this salience; second, in light of the 
foregoing theoretical and empirical considerations, the conversational salience 
of political misinformation is importantly connected to its damaging conversa-
tional effects. Accordingly, here also, counterspeech risks being as futile as trying 
to “unring a bell”: instead of undoing the damaging conversational effects of po-
litical misinformation, it may amplify them.
This result constitutes a serious problem for deliberative theories of democ-
racy. This family of theories, recall, insists that exchanging information and ar-
guments helps to eliminate false beliefs and fallacious arguments.32 As Hélène 
Landemore acknowledges, this position presupposes that people will recognize 
correct views and sound arguments when presented with them.33 If, however, 
having deliberators challenge falsehoods amplifies their salience—which in-
creases listeners’ disposition to believe them—then this presupposition fails. 
Not only are people not necessarily swayed by sound counterarguments, but 
such counterarguments may instead entrench their false beliefs.
We have arrived at a deep and general problem for counterspeech. Because 
of the asymmetric pliability of conversational norms—which itself stems from 
a broader salience-related asymmetry—tackling hateful and non-hateful igno-
29 For a review, see Lewandowsky et al., “Misinformation and Its Correction,” 113–21.
30 Lewandowsky et al., “Misinformation and Its Correction,” 115. 
31 Berinsky, “Rumors and Health Care Reform,” 254–60.
32 See note 5 above.
33 Landemore, “Yes, We Can (Make It Up on Volume),” 220.
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rant speech risks being ineffective or worse. We have already seen one possible 
response to this problem: Simpson suggests that, in the face of the problem of 
stickiness, we may have to change the subject, or wait for salient falsehoods to 
become unsalient. Unfortunately, neither option is wholly satisfactory: often, sa-
lient falsehoods bear precisely on the subject we are interested in, and the issue 
at hand may be so pressing that there is no time to wait. In what follows, I will 
offer an alternative response by demonstrating that the objection at hand relies 
on an insufficiently sophisticated account of counterspeech. 
2. Positive Counterspeech
2.1. Positive and Negative Counterspeech
In the first place, the objection under consideration overlooks the distinction 
between negative and positive counterspeech. One way to counter ignorant 
speech is to explicitly negate its ignorant content. “It is false,” a politician might 
announce, “that Obamacare will implement death panels.” Similarly, civil rights 
activists might respond to hate speech by insisting “Xs are not lazy parasites!” 
Call this negative counterspeech. Because it involves repeating the ignorant prop-
osition in the process of negating it, negative counterspeech risks strengthening 
its conversational salience. Accordingly, this kind of counterspeech is highly vul-
nerable to the stickiness of ignorant speech.
But there is another way of verbally countering ignorant speech. As we have 
seen, the harder-to-reverse quality of some conversational norms results partly 
from a salience-based asymmetry: it is easier to make associations salient than 
unsalient. So far, we have focused on how this general asymmetry applies to in-
correct associations, hateful (section 1.1) and non-hateful (section 1.2). However, 
the asymmetry applies to correct associations as well: ceteris paribus, it is also 
easier to make correct associations salient than unsalient. 
As a result, the asymmetric pliability of conversational norms does not sug-
gest that all kinds of counterspeech are bound to be ineffective. Rather, it rec-
ommends a distinctive kind of counterspeech. To avoid reinforcing the salience 
of false associations, we should steer clear of counterspeech whose form is pri-
marily negative. Instead, we should privilege positive forms of counterspeech, 
which aim to put forward and render salient correct associations of ideas. On 
this approach, countering ignorance is less about directly contesting a distorted 
vision of the world, and more about affirming a correct vision of the world that 
is inconsistent with the falsehoods at hand.34 Because positive speech entails or 
34 While philosophical and legal debates typically ignore this distinction, it resonates with 
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implicates, but does not explicitly assert, that the ignorant speech in question is 
false, it avoids increasing the ignorant proposition’s salience—and, by extension, 
it avoids strengthening the conversational effects of ignorant speech. Moreover, 
because positive counterspeech makes correct associations salient instead, it 
harnesses the asymmetric pliability of conversational norms in the interests of 
truth: once salient, correct representations are comparatively difficult to render 
unsalient.35 
some discussions in social psychology. Since the pioneering work of Tversky and Kahneman 
(“The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice”), social psychologists have 
investigated how framing messages in different ways—including negative versus positive 
ways—can alter their impact on listeners. Although Tversky and Kahneman themselves do 
not explore how framing might affect attempts at correcting previous misinformation, this 
more specific application has been taken up in the subsequent literature. Lewandowsky et 
al., for instance, recommend that corrections avoid repeating myths, and suggest that cor-
rections “should be more successful when they can be encoded as an affirmation of an al-
ternative attribute” (“Misinformation and Its Correction,” 115–17). Though these comments 
are brief, and focus exclusively on ordinary misinformation, they seem congruent with my 
recommendation, inasmuch as they suggest countering falsehoods in an affirmative mode, 
rather than by negating falsehoods. 
35 This last claim might seem too quick. As Leslie has argued, human beings are disposed 
to generalize strikingly negative information more quickly—and on the basis of less ev-
idence—than neutral or positive information (“The Original Sin of Cognition,” 395–99). 
Accordingly, one might think that negative associations are “stronger” than positive associ-
ations, so that positive associations are easier to make unsalient than negative associations. 
There are two things to say in response to this concern. First, Leslie’s argument does not 
speak directly to the salience of positive and negative associations. Put differently, her ev-
idence may indeed show that in one respect—the tendency to be generalized—negative 
associations are stronger than positive associations. But, from this, it need not follow that 
negative associations are stronger in the respect under consideration—namely, the diffi-
culty of being made unsalient. After all, it could conceivably be the case that (1) while neg-
ative information is salient, we are more likely to generalize on its basis than on the basis 
of positive information, but that (2) negative information is no more difficult to render 
unsalient than positive information. Still, Leslie’s argument relating to generalization might 
be thought to at least suggest the possibility that, by analogy, negative associations might 
be more difficult to render unsalient than positive associations. However—and this is the 
second point—even if this hypothesis is true, it remains consistent with my main point 
here: that, in virtue of how salience works, positive associations are more difficult to render 
unsalient than to initially render salient. Indeed, we can think that such a salience-based 
asymmetry applies to positive associations (which creates a hurdle that opposing speech 
must overcome) while allowing that this asymmetry is even stronger in the case of negative 
associations. This is congruent with the kind of evidence Leslie finds. She finds that we 
typically generalize more quickly on the basis of negative information than on the basis of 
positive information, not that we do not generalize on the basis of positive information. In 
fact, she even acknowledges that, although this is less common, the tendency to rapid gen-
eralization “arguably applies to strikingly positive information” (“The Original Sin of Cog-
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Notice that resorting to positive counterspeech does not amount to simply 
changing the subject. The truths that positive counterspeech affirms bear on the 
same issue as negative counterspeech. This is guaranteed by the fact that the 
content of positive counterspeech is supposed to entail (or at least implicate) 
the falsehood of the targeted ignorant speech. So, positive counterspeech ex-
presses a similar proposition as negative counterspeech, but under a different 
mode of presentation. Consider: “The star of King’s Row was married twice” and 
“The fortieth US president was married twice” make the same claim about the 
world (namely, that Ronald Reagan was married twice) while highlighting dif-
ferent facets of that claim (one highlights Reagan’s film career, the other his po-
litical role). Analogously, positive and negative counterspeech tell us something 
similar about the state of the world, while emphasizing different features of that 
state: while negative counterspeech reactivates incorrect associations in the pro-
cess of negating them, positive counterspeech activates correct associations. 
Consider an example. In his “I Have a Dream” speech, Martin Luther King Jr. 
takes a stand against a deeply racist public culture, which is rife with statements 
professing that black Americans are morally, culturally, and intellectually inferi-
or to whites. Famously, King does so by vividly depicting a vision of racial equal-
ity. In this vision, the American nation “will rise up and live out the true meaning 
of its creed: ‘We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created 
equal,’” and, accordingly, “the sons of former slaves and the sons of former slave 
owners will be able to sit down together at the table of brotherhood.”36 King’s 
utterance is very different from saying: “That’s false! Black Americans are not 
immoral, uncivilized, or stupid!” While his vision of racial equality entails—or 
at the very least, strongly implicates—the falsehood of these racist stereotypes, 
it is first and foremost a positive representation of racial equality. This differ-
ence matters. Because it does not repeat the racist stereotypes, King’s positive 
speech does not enhance their salience in the public sphere. Instead, it draws his 
audience’s attention away from these stereotypes, and toward a different—and 
incompatible—set of associations: namely, between the American dream and 
the values of equality and interracial unity.37
nition,” 397n10). So the analogy at hand does not endanger my thesis that the salience-based 
asymmetry might work for correct and positive associations: it suggests, rather, that this 
effect might work even more strongly when the associations in question are negative.
36 King, “I Have a Dream.”
37 As this example indicates, in advocating positive counterspeech—which, when leveled at 
hateful speech, may well involve putting forward an egalitarian vision—I am in agreement 
with McGowan’s suggestion that speech can be used to enact egalitarian norms (Just Words, 
185–89). There are, however, at least two reasons why McGowan’s discussion of positive 
speech needs developing. First, because McGowan only discusses the positive potential 
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Positive counterspeech can also be used to oppose ordinary political misin-
formation. In response to a misleading statement X (say, that the UK pays the EU 
£350 million a week, which could benefit the National Health Service instead), 
one strategy is to say: “X is false. We do not pay that amount.” But another strat-
egy would be to conduct a public education campaign that avoids mentioning X 
and instead draws the public’s attention to facts that entail X’s falsehood. Such a 
campaign might publicize facts about what the UK receives from the EU (includ-
ing, if applicable, how free movement in Europe helps staff the National Health 
Service).38 And it might also reveal facts about what the UK actually pays the EU 
(expressed, perhaps, as a proportion of overall spending, so as to highlight its 
comparatively small size). Such a public response would entail that the UK does 
not pay the EU as much as X claimed, and that it is misleading to posit a contrast 
between funding the EU and funding the National Health Service. In doing so, 
however, it would avoid repeating the £350 million figure, and would therefore 
avoid reinforcing its salience. 
In fact, there is empirical evidence that such positive responses to political 
misinformation are more likely to succeed. Notice, first, that the pessimistic 
evidence mentioned in section 1.2 involved paradigmatic instances of negative 
counterspeech. The CDC “myth versus fact” flyers about vaccines worked by 
reiterating myths and labeling them “false.” Moreover, the result that correct-
ing Obamacare death-panel rumors was ineffective obtained primarily in cases 
where the rumors were explicitly repeated beforehand. By contrast, when sub-
jects did not repeat the rumor beforehand, corrections actually tended to reduce 
support for the rumor.39 Likewise, Lewandowsky et al. report that people are 
more likely to reject false reports about how a fire started if, instead of simply 
being told that the initial report was false, they are given an alternative narrative 
of how the fire began.40 On this basis, they hypothesize that, when correcting 
misinformation, it is better to “emphasize the facts you wish to communicate 
rather than the myth.”41
of speech by way of concluding Just Words, her exploration of this idea is quite brief and 
suggestive. Second, and more substantively, McGowan does not connect her concluding 
discussion of the positive potential of speech with her earlier critique of counterspeech ear-
lier in Just Words. Specifically, in chapter 5, McGowan criticizes the use of counterspeech to 
respond to oppressive speech by appealing to the asymmetric pliability of conversational 
norms (Just Words, 11–20). What I am suggesting is that, provided counterspeech takes a 
“positive” form (as I define it here), it can go some way toward alleviating this concern. 
38 Blitz, “Brexit and the ‘NHS Dividend.’”
39 Berinsky, “Rumors and Health Care Reform,” 258.
40 Lewandowsky et al., “Misinformation and Its Correction,” 117. 
41 Lewandowsky et al., “Misinformation and Its Correction,” 123. 
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In light of the positive conception of counterspeech, counterspeech seems 
more promising than trying to unring a bell. The conversational norms enacted 
by ignorant speech are difficult to reverse primarily when counterspeech takes 
a negative form, which repeats the ignorant contents to debunk them. But pos-
itive counterspeech is less vulnerable to this problem. It draws attention away 
from false associations, and instead renders salient correct associations that en-
tail or implicate the falsehood of ignorant utterances. In doing so, positive coun-
terspeech repurposes the asymmetric pliability of conversational norms, and 
makes it work for truth rather than falsehood. 
2.2. Concerns with Positive Counterspeech
Even though distinguishing between positive and negative counterspeech helps 
alleviate the problem of stickiness, difficulties remain. The first problem is that, 
in some cases, positive counterspeech seems unavailable. Positive counterspeech 
affirms a view that entails or implicates the falsehood of the targeted ignorant 
speech without repeating or invoking its contents. So, positive counterspeech is 
available as an alternative to negative counterspeech only insofar as there exists 
a way of presenting the negation of the ignorant contents that does not explicitly 
invoke those contents. For instance, in King’s “I Have a Dream” speech, positive 
counterspeech is possible because there is a way of presenting racial equality—
namely, King’s vision of interracial unity and brotherhood—that is not simply 
the explicit negation of racist stereotypes.
For some instances of ignorant speech, however, there is no way of saying 
something that entails or suggests the falsehood of the ignorant speech besides 
invoking and rejecting its ignorant contents. Conspiracy theories seem especial-
ly liable to generate this difficulty. By definition, conspiracy theories propound 
extremely improbable causal stories, which lack credible evidence. Because these 
stories are so improbable, it is difficult verbally to oppose conspiracy theories in 
a way that does not inadvertently invoke—or “ring the bell” of—the conspiracy 
theory. 
Consider birtherism, the theory that Barack Obama was born in Kenya and 
is therefore ineligible for the US presidency.42 Negative counterspeech—saying 
that Obama was not born in Kenya—clearly reactivates the association between 
Obama and Kenya. But it is not clear what the positive alternative would be. Vig-
orously affirming that Obama was born in Hawaii would be a highly unusual 
thing to do, were it not for the concern that Obama was born outside the US. Put 
differently, because the conversational salience of the birtherist myth is the main 
reason why Obama’s birthplace is politically worth talking about, it is difficult 
42 Smith and Tau, “Birtherism.”
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to say anything on this topic without inadvertently invoking or reactivating the 
birtherist myth. Given this background fact about conversational salience, in-
sisting that Obama was born in Hawaii risks, like negative counterspeech, calling 
attention to the concern that he was born in Kenya. 
The problem so far has been that genuine positive counterspeech—which 
opposes falsehoods without reinvoking them—may sometimes be unavailable. 
But there is a more fundamental problem. Even when we can use positive coun-
terspeech to reverse the conversational salience of ignorant associations, coun-
terspeech cannot reverse the harms that ignorant speech brought about while it 
was salient. McGowan articulates this concern when discussing sexist speech: 
the mere fact that an act of oppression can easily be reversed does not 
entirely disqualify it as oppressive. . . . While shorter-lived [oppressive 
norms] may be less oppressive . . . they are still oppressive.43 
The point is straightforward. Even if counterspeech can deactivate vilifying ste-
reotypes, it presumably cannot change the fact that they had been activated up 
to that point. And, consequently, it cannot change the fact that, while they were 
activated, their salience gave rise to harms. 
This concern is not specific to oppressive or hateful types of ignorant speech. 
Indeed, Laura Caponetto’s taxonomy of the ways in which speech can “undo” 
the effects of prior utterances lends more general support to the worry. Accord-
ing to Caponetto, speech can recognize that a past utterance failed to enact the 
norms we thought it did. For instance, when a newspaper reveals that Father 
Tom was not actually a priest, and the Roman Rota (or a similarly qualified insti-
tution) responds by declaring that the marriages he officiated are null and void, 
this declaration constitutes a recognition that the validity of these marriages was 
only purported all along.44 Alternatively, speech can amend or retract conversa-
tional norms that were enacted by prior utterances, so that these norms are dis-
continued.45 But what Caponetto explicitly refrains from saying is that speech 
can retroactively make it the case that certain conversational norms were never 
enacted to begin with.46
If Caponetto is right to refrain from attributing this retroactive ability to 
speech, then this highlights a second sense in which counterspeech might seem 
as futile as trying to unring a bell. Even if you can eventually stop a bell from con-
tinuing to ring, you cannot undo the fact that it rang in the first place. Analogous-
43 McGowan, “Oppressive Speech,” 404–5. 
44 Caponetto, “Undoing Things with Words,” 2, 6–8. 
45 Caponetto, “Undoing Things with Words,” 9–14.
46 Caponetto, “Undoing Things with Words,” 10.
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ly, even if positive counterspeech can stop the harmful conversational effects of 
ignorant speech from persisting, it can never change the fact that these harmful 
effects occurred up to that point. So, even in the best cases, positive counterspeech 
seems a limited remedy for ignorant speech: it cannot fully eliminate its harms.
Still, even if it is true that counterspeech is limited in this way, one might 
respond that it is unfair to hold this against proponents of counterspeech. After 
all, asking of counterspeech that it somehow fully eliminate the harms of igno-
rant speech, or that it somehow make it the case that the ignorant speech never 
occurred, may seem impossibly demanding. And if this demand is unrealistic or 
unachievable, then it seems misguided to make it.
What this response reveals is that the objection at hand makes sense only 
in light of a particular understanding of what the alternative to counterspeech 
should be. Critics of counterspeech are typically not suggesting that, in place 
of counterspeech, we do nothing. Rather, they commonly recommend imple-
menting legal restrictions.47 Crucially, the legal regulation of hate speech, or 
of fake news, is often justified as a deterrent: by imposing penalties, criminal 
or civil laws get people to refrain from uttering hateful or deceptive contents. 
When legal remedies succeed as deterrents, they fully eliminate the harms that 
suppressed utterances would otherwise have occasioned. Indeed, insofar as legal 
remedies prevent ignorant utterances altogether, they prevent any harms these 
might have generated. Thus, to the extent that legal restrictions succeed as deter-
rents—an assumption I will revisit in section 3.2—the objection at hand places 
counterspeech at a comparative disadvantage relative to legal remedies: whereas 
counterspeech comes in too late to eliminate all of the harms associated with 
ignorant speech, legal remedies can in principle fully remove those harms. This, 
in turn, would constitute a reason for preferring legal remedies to counterspeech. 
The following section will argue that the two concerns just outlined rely on 
an overly crude conception of the temporality of counterspeech. My focus will 
primarily be on the second concern—that counterspeech, even if it takes a posi-
tive form, cannot reverse the harmful effects that ignorant speech generated pri-
or to being countered. Nevertheless, in closing, I will also indicate how the view 
of counterspeech’s temporality that I develop can defuse the first concern.
3. The Temporality of Counterspeech
There are at least two potential ways of rethinking the temporality of counter-
speech to address the above objections: the first approach emphasizes the retro-
active character of counterspeech; the second underscores its diachronic nature. 
47 See, e.g., McGowan, Just Words, ch. 7.
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While the first strategy is fascinating, I will suggest that, even if we grant its the-
oretical viability, it ultimately cannot overcome the objections at hand (3.1). The 
second approach, by contrast, meets with greater success (3.2). 
3.1. Retroactive Counterspeech
In the first place, one might object that the objections raised in section 2.2 do not 
take the retroactive potential of counterspeech sufficiently seriously. 
It seems perfectly natural to think that the past cannot be changed. By exten-
sion, the idea that counterspeech could alter the past may, as Caponetto labels 
it, seem “magica[l].”48 Accordingly, one might well conclude that speech can at 
best stop the conversational effects of prior utterances from persisting, but it 
cannot make it the case that those effects never happened to begin with—and 
hence, it cannot fully eliminate the harms of ignorant speech. 
However, Rae Langton has recently argued that this skepticism is misplaced. 
Beyond putting a stop to the preexisting conversational effects of past utter-
ances, Langton suggests, counterspeech can retroactively block the occurrence 
of these conversational effects altogether. More precisely, retroactive counter-
speech “changes a past utterance from the unactualized way it would have been, 
to the way it actually is.”49 In this way, counterspeech “offers a ticket to a modest 
time machine.”50 Applied to ignorant speech, the idea is that counterspeech can 
make it the case that prior utterances failed to ever generate certain damaging 
conversational effects. If so, then one might think that—contra the second ob-
jection raised in section 2.2—counterspeech can entirely eliminate the harms of 
ignorant speech.
The immediate question, however, is why we should accept Langton’s coun-
terintuitive claim that counterspeech can retroactively alter the nature of prior 
utterances. Langton offers two reasons. The first is that, in many other domains, 
we already recognize that an act’s character can retroactively be altered by future 
happenings. “A stabbing may be a killing,” Langton observes, “partly in virtue of 
what happens later.”51 In other words, the fact that a stabbing is also a killing may 
depend on the fact that the victim later succumbed to her wounds. If doctors had 
managed to save the victim’s life, the past stabbing would arguably have consti-
tuted a nonlethal assault instead. Thus, if Langton is correct, we cannot dismiss 
the idea of retroactive counterspeech simply on the grounds that retroactivity 
seems “magical”—we already recognize retroactive phenomena in everyday life.
48 Caponetto, “Undoing Things with Words,” 10.
49 Langton, “Blocking as Counterspeech,” 156.
50 Langton, “Blocking as Counterspeech,” 146. 
51 Langton, “Blocking as Counterspeech,” 157.
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Nevertheless, even if some facts can retroactively be made true, one might 
doubt whether this applies to facts about the effects of past utterances. To es-
tablish this stronger claim, Langton offers a second argument. Drawing on Aus-
tinian speech-act theory, Langton distinguishes two kinds of things utterances 
can do. Utterances can cause things to happen. For instance, delivering a brilliant 
argument can cause one’s audience to affirm its conclusion. This is roughly what 
Austin refers to as an utterance’s perlocutionary dimension. But utterances can 
also constitute certain acts. When a priest says, “I hereby pronounce you hus-
band and wife,” she is not merely causing the couple to be married. Instead, her 
utterance is part and parcel of, or constitutive of, the act of marrying them. The 
speech act(s) constituted in saying something belong(s) to the utterance’s illo-
cutionary dimension.52
For an utterance successfully to constitute a particular speech act—marrying 
a couple, declaring war, etc.—certain background conditions (“felicity condi-
tions”) must be satisfied.53 What kinds of felicity conditions are needed will vary 
from speech act to speech act. According to McGowan, however, most speech 
acts depend on the speaker having a particular status or social power.54 Some 
speech acts (such as marrying, condemning, or ordering) require that the speak-
er have a comparatively high or special status, which is commonly referred to 
as “authority.”55 But, McGowan insists, even speech acts that do not require au-
thority nevertheless require that speakers have a minimal and widespread status 
(which she calls “standing”) in virtue of which they are capable of taking part 
in conversations.56 Should key felicity conditions not be satisfied, the utterance 
will misfire, or fail to constitute the relevant speech act.57 If the officiant for a re-
ligious wedding has not been ordained, for instance, then she lacks the relevant 
authority and her utterance, “I hereby pronounce you married,” will fail to marry 
the couple. Similarly, if a lowly private (rather than a general) shouts “Attack!” to 
an assembled army, he will (in normal conditions) fail to order that army into 
battle.
52 Langton, “Speech Acts and Unspeakable Acts,” 300–1. See also Austin, How to Do Things 
with Words, 98–108.
53 Austin, How to Do Things with Words, 12–49.
54 McGowan, Just Words, 15, 63–68.
55 McGowan, Just Words, 63–66. See also Langton, “Speech Acts and Unspeakable Acts,” 304–
5; and Austin, How to Do Things with Words, 23–24.
56 McGowan, Just Words, 66–68.
57 Note, however, that not all felicity conditions are like this: some are such that, when they 
fail to be satisfied, the intended speech act is nonetheless constituted, though it is nonideal. 
See Austin, How to Do Things with Words, 39–52.
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Crucially, Langton claims, felicity conditions for speech acts can sometimes 
be satisfied in the future, after the utterance. By way of illustration, she considers 
the case of marriage: “for ‘I do’ to count as a marriage,” she suggests, “may require 
felicity conditions in the future, e.g., the consummation of the marriage.”58 This, 
on Langton’s analysis, is what makes retroactively undoing a speech act possible: 
if a future felicity condition fails to be satisfied, then it follows that the past utter-
ance misfired. Applied to the marriage case, the idea is that, if some “sad events” 
keep the couple from consummating the marriage, this makes it the case that the 
earlier “I do” failed to constitute a speech act of marrying.59
The final step in Langton’s argument is to emphasize that counterspeech can 
be a way of challenging the future felicity conditions of speech acts. To see this, 
consider again that many speech acts require that the speaker have authority. 
Thus, in attempting to perform such speech acts, speakers tend to presuppose 
that they have the relevant kind of authority. And, except in cases where their 
authority is already firmly entrenched, they depend on their audience to accept 
that presupposition. Consequently, a significant way in which counterspeech can 
block a speech act is by challenging such presuppositions of authority.60 A col-
league tells you, “A double espresso; make it quick!” and you furiously respond, 
“Who do you think you are? I don’t take orders from you!” The colleague’s utter-
ance presupposes that they have the authority needed to give you orders. In de-
nying that presupposition, you prevent their speech from constituting an order. 
At best, it becomes a (very unsuccessful) request.61 The thought, then, is that by 
undermining a future felicity condition of the utterance, your response retroac-
tively changes the nature of that utterance.
Returning to ignorant speech, if this theoretical analysis is correct, it suggests 
that counterspeech can retroactively make it the case that past ignorant utter-
ances failed to enact problematic conversational norms. Imagine that A tells B: 
“Your kind are nothing but worthless parasites!” In uttering this falsehood, as we 
saw in section 1.2, A might be attempting to constitute the following harmful 
speech act: to refute the assurance that B is a member of society in good stand-
ing. Now, suppose that A is part of a minority extremist political group—a group 
whose authority to determine others’ social status is not already firmly estab-
lished.62 And suppose, moreover, that C—a spokesperson for the majority—in-
58 Langton, “Blocking as Counterspeech,” 157. 
59 Langton, “Blocking as Counterspeech.”
60 Langton, “Blocking as Counterspeech,” 150.
61 Langton, “Blocking as Counterspeech,” 156.
62 This stipulation is important. As I specified in the previous paragraph, the ability for coun-
terspeech to block a harmful speech act by challenging a speaker’s authority is restricted to 
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terjects: “You don’t speak for us, A. And we will never condone that kind of view.” 
In challenging A’s presupposed authority, C retroactively makes A’s utterance 
misfire. A’s utterance does not refute the assurance of B’s standing, because A 
lacks the requisite authority. In sum, if Langton’s theoretical account is correct, 
then—contra the second objection outlined in section 2.2—counterspeech can 
do more than simply stop ignorant utterances from continuing to harm: by chal-
lenging the future felicity conditions of prior ignorant utterances, it can retroac-
tively prevent past utterances from ever constituting harmful speech acts.
However, there are problems with the idea of retroactive counterspeech. In 
the first place, Langton’s arguments for its possibility might seem contentious. 
For one thing, one might deny that the concrete cases Langton points to really 
do intuitively involve retroactive phenomena. In the stabbing case, for instance, 
one might give epistemic significance, rather than constitutive significance, to the 
victim’s death. On this view, the victim’s death merely shows us that the pre-
vious stabbing was also a killing. Alternatively, one might think that the death 
does make the stabbing a killing, while denying that this constitutive function is 
retroactive: that is, after the death has occurred, the stabbing counts as a killing 
from the time of death onward, but not before. As for the marriage case, it is un-
clear that consummation is actually a necessary felicity condition for the success 
of speech acts of marrying.63 If so, then the failure to consummate the marriage 
may not actually retroactively affect its validity.
Moreover, the argument for retroactive counterspeech may come at a the-
oretical cost. The stabbing case suggests that the future felicity conditions for 
an utterance to constitute a specific illocutionary act may include some of its 
perlocutionary effects. As a result, one might worry that, in explaining how ret-
roactive counterspeech is possible, Langton’s account ends up blurring the dis-
tinction between illocutionary and perlocutionary dimensions of utterances.64 
Nevertheless, I want to grant, for the sake of argument, that these concerns 
about the possibility of retroactive counterspeech can be overcome. My main 
point is that, even if we assume that retroactive counterspeech is possible (and 
cases where the speaker somehow depends on the audience either accepting or at least not 
challenging their authority. In cases where the speaker’s authority is already firmly estab-
lished (for example, if the chancellor of the Third Reich said the same thing as A) counter-
speech may not be able to retroactively block the harmful speech act. In section 4, I briefly 
reiterate this limitation and its implications for whether we ought to adopt legal restrictions.
63 Indeed, in Catholic doctrine, consummation may be required to make a marriage indissol-
uble. But this is consistent with a marriage being valid. Here, and in the previous case, I am 
grateful to a reviewer for drawing my attention to these complications.
64 I owe this insight to a reviewer. For further criticisms of Langton’s account of retroactive 
blocking, see McGowan, Just Words, 48.
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that it is realized in the cases Langton points to), it cannot entirely defuse the 
present objection. 
Langton’s analysis of how speech can retroactively block earlier utterances 
focuses exclusively on utterances’ illocutionary dimension—i.e., on what acts 
might be constituted by those utterances. But, as explained above, utterances also 
have a perlocutionary dimension: besides constituting acts, utterances also have 
causal effects, such as getting listeners to believe something. The retroactive pic-
ture of counterspeech does not establish, and is not intended to establish, that 
these causal effects can be undone.
First, even if counterspeech prevents an utterance from constituting a par-
ticular speech act, that utterance might still causally influence listeners as if the 
speech act had been successful. This is because listeners may not know that the 
felicity conditions are not satisfied. Suppose Langton is right that, if A and B fail 
to consummate their marriage, their “I do’s” fail to constitute the speech act of 
marrying. Even so, if people never find out, the utterance “I do” will retain its ha-
bitual causal consequences. Friends will congratulate the couple on subsequent 
anniversaries, the Internal Revenue Service will tax them as a married couple, 
immigration services will grant A a spousal visa when B takes a job in a different 
country, and so on. 
Second, there is no way of undoing these causal effects after the fact. To reit-
erate, the reason why acts constituted by utterances can retroactively be undone 
is that their performance depends on felicity conditions, and felicity conditions 
can sometimes be satisfied after the utterance. By contrast, the causal effects of 
utterances do not depend on felicity conditions in this way. Therefore, once the 
causal effects have occurred, nothing can change this fact. As Caponetto nicely 
illustrates: “one can take back a marriage proposal, but one cannot take back the 
hearer’s excitement at hearing the words ‘Will you marry me?’”65
This spells trouble for counterspeech directed at ignorant speech, because 
many of the harms attributed to ignorant speech are causal. For instance, one of 
the ways in which hate speech harms its targets is by causing them to experience 
psychological distress, particularly when the hate speaker is perceived to have 
significant social authority. Now, for Alexander Brown, it is “hard to see how any 
counterspeech could ameliorate some of the[se] psychological harms.”66 Above, 
I suggested that counterspeech can undermine hate speakers’ authority. If the 
retroactive blocking account is correct, doing so can retroactively prevent hate 
speech from constituting certain harmful speech acts (since it undermines a fe-
licity condition for such speech acts). Furthermore, it can help targets feel less 
65 Caponetto, “Undoing Things with Words,” 4. 
66 Brown, “Hate Speech Law,” 260.
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distressed by the hate speech than they previously did (once they realize that 
it only represents the views of a small minority). Even so, Brown’s point is that 
counterspeech cannot undo the distress experienced by targets of hate speech 
in the intervening period, before counterspeech told them that the hate speakers 
lacked social support.
A similar observation applies to ordinary political misinformation. Counter-
speech might, by undermining the authority (or even standing) of a source of 
misinformation, get the audience at large subsequently to reject that source’s 
claims. But it cannot change the causal harms generated by political misinfor-
mation before it was verbally countered. Imagine that, following an election, an 
anonymous blogger publicly and falsely claims that the election was rigged. 
While the vast majority of people withhold judgment as to whether the blog 
post is reliable, and some express uncertainty about its reliability, a minority flies 
into a rage upon hearing this, and responds by destroying private property. Even 
if counterspeech later repudiates the blogger’s credibility in a way that all find 
convincing, it clearly cannot undo the destruction caused in the intervening pe-
riod.67
The upshot is that, at best, the appeal to retroactive counterspeech can only 
help address the objection that counterspeech cannot undo the harms generat-
ed by ignorant speech before it was countered to a limited extent. If Langton is 
right, counterspeech can retroactively make it the case that a prior ignorant ut-
terance did not constitute a harmful speech act. But it cannot retroactively undo 
the past causal harms of ignorant speech. 
This limitation matters, once more, in light of the comparison between coun-
terspeech and legal remedies. By contrast with counterspeech, insofar as legal 
remedies successfully prevent ignorant speech from being uttered, they can 
entirely eliminate its harms, both constitutive and causal. So, even if we were 
67 A possible complication with this example is that, on Maitra’s account of “licensed author-
ity,” it is possible for a speaker to acquire authority even if the majority does not accept 
their claims (“Subordinating Speech,” 107). Consequently, one might worry that, in the 
example, the blogger succeeds in gaining authority prior to the counterspeech, so that the 
counterspeech fails to retroactively block their authority. A first response is that it is unclear 
that this example really is a case of licensing in Maitra’s sense. In Maitra’s discussion, the 
phenomenon of licensing standardly involves the audience remaining silent, or not making 
their reservations public (“Subordinating Speech,” 107, 116). By contrast, in the above case, 
even before the challenge to the blogger’s presupposed authority occurs, some members 
of the majority express their uncertainty about the blogger’s credibility. Second, and more 
fundamentally, this concern does not undermine my main point here: that point, once more, 
is that even if we assume, for the sake of argument, that the counterspeech in this example has 
successfully retroactively blocked the blogger’s authority, it still cannot possibly reverse the 
causal harms produced by the misinformation in the meantime. 
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to grant Langton’s theoretical case for thinking that counterspeech can operate 
retroactively, counterspeech would still in principle remain at a comparative dis-
advantage with legal remedies. 
3.2. Diachronic Counterspeech
There is a second way in which the objection under consideration—that coun-
terspeech cannot undo the harms generated by ignorant speech before it was 
countered—depends on an inadequate account of the temporality of counter-
speech. Simply put, counterspeech should not merely be interpreted as speech 
that responds to ignorant utterances after the fact. Rather, counterspeech is bet-
ter understood as diachronic—as a continuous process, extended over time, that 
precedes as well as follows ignorant speech. Thus understood, counterspeech 
might involve educating listeners to inoculate them against future ignorant 
speech, or preemptively warning listeners about unreliable sources. 
A diachronic understanding is implicit in some defenses of counterspeech. 
When discussing state counterspeech, for instance, Brettschneider recommends 
having schools teach children about important political matters, such as the Ho-
locaust.68 This counterspeech is diachronic insofar as it may affect its audience 
prior to their exposure to relevant ignorant utterances: schoolchildren may never 
have encountered Holocaust denial. Similarly, in her analysis of “toxic speech,” 
Tirrell recognizes that counterspeech can work both as a post hoc “antidote” and 
as a preventive “inoculation.”69
Nevertheless, the vast majority of discussions of counterspeech articulated 
by philosophers of language—including the objection currently under exam-
ination—cast counterspeech as a post hoc response to ignorant utterances. Ca-
ponetto’s examples of undoing things with words, for example, are invariably 
verbal attempts at disabling an earlier utterance.70 Likewise, Maitra and Mc-
Gowan criticize counterspeech partly by appealing to evidence that targets of 
face-to-face hate speech rarely respond to that speech then and there. Here too, 
counterspeech is understood as a post hoc response.71 In recent work, McGowan 
does briefly acknowledge that counterspeech could take a broader form, such 
as “a general education campaign.” But she insists that her focus, in critiquing 
counterspeech, is on counterspeech understood as “direct and fairly immediate 
68 Brettschneider, When the State Speaks, What Should It Say? 96–104. 
69 Tirrell, “Toxic Speech,” 136–39. See also Richards and Calvert, “Counterspeech 2000,” 569–
74; and Gelber, “Reconceptualizing Counterspeech in Hate Speech Policy (with a Focus on 
Australia),” 214–15.
70 Caponetto, “Undoing Things with Words.” See also Langton, “Blocking as Counterspeech.”
71 Maitra and McGowan, “Introduction and Overview,” 10. 
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responses to allegedly harmful utterances.”72 However, limiting her scope in this 
way substantially limits the significance of her criticisms. Defenders of counter-
speech can reply that they are recommending not simply post hoc responses, but 
counterspeech that may both preempt and follow ignorant speech. Indeed, such 
diachronic counterspeech, I will now suggest, can go some way toward defusing 
the objection at hand. 
When counterspeech occurs after ignorant speech, the problem is that igno-
rant speech can generate harms prior to being countered, and—at least in the 
case of causal harms—these harms cannot be undone. How does counterspeech 
that precedes ignorant speech help? The idea is that preemptive counterspeech 
can condition the conversational setting to make it inhospitable to ignorant 
speech. Consequently, when ignorant speech is later uttered, it fails to have its 
damaging conversational effects. This helps address the problem: if preemp-
tive counterspeech disables ignorant speech before it is uttered, then there is 
no interval during which ignorant speech can, unopposed, generate irreversible 
harms.
The basic idea is straightforward. What needs elaboration is how precisely 
preemptive counterspeech might condition the conversational setting so as to 
disable subsequent ignorant utterances. There are at least two promising strat-
egies. The first is to expound and widely diffuse important politically relevant 
facts. Advancing such truths alters the conversation in several ways. First, it ren-
ders those truths conversationally salient, and thereby familiarizes listeners with 
them. Relatedly, it facilitates the introduction of these truths into the common 
ground of shared beliefs. Indeed, preemptively expounding facts can induce lis-
teners to believe those facts for various reasons: because the speaker is perceived 
as authoritative; because the speaker offers compelling arguments for them; or 
simply because, as we have seen, the more familiar propositions are to listeners, 
the more listeners are disposed to believe them.
This conditioning makes it more difficult for falsehoods to subsequently gain 
a foothold in the conversation. Insofar as listeners are knowledgeable about a 
subject matter, they are less vulnerable to being swayed by ignorant speech. Ho-
locaust denial or misleading claims about EU funding are less readily accepted 
if they contradict propositions on these topics that are already part of the au-
dience’s common ground. Moreover, as discussed in section 1.1, it is harder to 
make ideas unsalient than salient. Accordingly, if true propositions have already 
been made salient by preemptive counterspeech—which, in turn, disposes the 
audience to believe them—ignorant speech may struggle to render them unsa-
lient. 
72 McGowan, “Responding to Harmful Speech,” 183. 
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A second preemptive strategy is to warn the audience about unreliable sourc-
es. By undermining the authority of untrustworthy sources, such preemptive 
counterspeech prevents those sources’ utterances from affecting conversations 
in damaging ways. This idea is akin to the silencing effect that philosophers of 
language often ascribe to hate speech and pornography. Hate speech and por-
nography, it is often said, prevent minorities and women from contributing ef-
fectively to conversations.73 One of the ways in which they do so is by stripping 
these groups of their authority.74 When hate speech persistently represents ra-
cial minorities as inferior, for instance, they may lose the social standing needed 
for their speech to be taken seriously.
I am suggesting that this silencing effect can also be used for good, by chal-
lenging the authority of prospective promoters of ignorance. This usage applies 
most clearly to political misinformation: if hearers are credibly warned that a 
political news site has been systematically wrong, that source’s subsequent utter-
ances may be taken less seriously. Nevertheless, it also applies to hateful ignorant 
speech. Suppose a democratically elected head of state affirms: “We categorical-
ly reject racist ideologies. Racism is unwelcome here.” The hate speaker who then 
pronounces deeply racist views thereby marks himself as a minority voice, who 
cannot speak for the majority.
Thus, counterspeech can condition the conversation to protect it from subse-
quent ignorant speech in at least two ways: by entrenching important facts in the 
conversation’s common ground, and by eroding ignorance-promoting speakers’ 
status, so that they no longer count as authorities.
Importantly, this preemptive conditioning is relevant to the constitutive and 
causal effects of ignorant speech. Like retroactive counterspeech, preemptive 
counterspeech can undermine the felicity conditions (such as authority) that 
ignorant utterances need to constitute harmful acts. The only difference with 
73 E.g., Langton, “Speech Acts and Unspeakable Acts”; Maitra and McGowan, “Introduction 
and Overview”; and McGowan, “Responding to Harmful Speech.” Note that I am using 
“silencing” in a loose sense. First, as I am using the idea, silencing includes both perlocution-
ary silencing (preventing speech from having its intended causal effects) and illocutionary 
silencing (preventing speech from constituting its intended speech acts). On this distinc-
tion, see Langton, “Speech Acts and Unspeakable Acts,” 314–15. Second, my use of the term 
is broader than typical discussions of silencing in the following way. Typically, silencing 
involves the speaker being prevented from doing certain things with their words as a re-
sult of a recognition failure on the part of the hearer. For example, the speaker might have 
authority, but the hearer fails to recognize this. However, in the cases I am concerned with 
here, silencing arguably does not involve a recognition failure: the speaker actually lacks pre-
established authority, and the hearer is right to think that they do not satisfy the authority 
condition. I am grateful to a reviewer for this insight. 
74 McGowan, “Debate,” 491–92.
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retroactive counterspeech is that, here, the felicity conditions are undermined 
before the problematic utterance.
In addition, preemptive counterspeech alleviates the difficulties that retro-
active counterspeech encountered with ignorant utterances’ causal harms. The 
causal effects of speech depend in significant part on what that speech is per-
ceived as.75 The problem with retroactive counterspeech is that, in the interval 
before ignorant speech is countered, a mismatch might arise between what the 
utterance actually is and what it is perceived as. Before retroactive counterspeech 
established that the purveyor of the vaccines-cause-autism myth was a crank, 
people may have believed that he was delivering an authoritative verdict, and 
followed his dangerous prescriptions. Preemptive counterspeech addresses this 
causal problem by eliminating the interval in which ignorant speech has been ut-
tered but not yet countered. In doing so, it reduces the likelihood of a temporary 
mismatch between what the ignorance is and what it is perceived as. If listeners 
already know that A is a crank when A speaks, they are less vulnerable to being 
duped into harmful actions. 
This theoretical account of how counterspeech might preemptively defuse 
the constitutive and causal effects of ignorant speech is not merely speculative. 
Cook, Lewandowsky, and Ecker, for instance, find that telling subjects about the 
scientific consensus on anthropogenic climate change neutralizes the causal im-
pact of subsequent climate-related misinformation.76 This corroborates the first 
preemptive strategy outlined above. By giving people authoritative testimony 
that climate change is real, the preemptive speech introduces this proposition 
into the common ground of shared beliefs. This makes it harder for subsequent 
climate-related misinformation to gain assent.
There is also support for the second preemptive strategy: casting doubt on 
the authority or credibility of unreliable sources. Lewandowsky et al. report that 
“misinformation effects can be reduced if people are explicitly warned . . . that 
information they are about to be given may be misleading.”77 For example, when 
people are warned that upcoming information about climate change may come 
75 Note that, while very many causal effects of utterances depend on how the utterance—and 
more specifically, its force—is perceived, some are not like this. The utterance “Move aside!” 
may cause me to move aside if I perceive it as an order. In addition, however, if it is extreme-
ly loud, it might also cause my ears to hurt or cause me to be startled. Arguably, neither of 
these latter two causal effects depends on what I perceive the utterance as. That being said, 
the harmful causal effects of ignorant speech I am concerned with here generally tend to 
stem from the perceived force of the utterance. 
76 Cook, Lewandowsky, and Ecker, “Neutralizing Misinformation through Inoculation,” 10.
77 Lewandowsky et al., “Misinformation and Its Correction,” 116. 
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from nonexperts, and given some indication of how to identify nonexperts, the 
influence of subsequent misinformation on their beliefs disappears.78 
So far, I have argued that adopting a diachronic view of counterspeech—
where counterspeech can preemptively disarm ignorant speech as well as ret-
rospectively oppose it—helps overcome the main objection considered in 
section 2.2: that counterspeech can only stop the conversational effects of igno-
rant speech from persisting, and hence cannot wholly eliminate its harms. But 
switching to a diachronic view of counterspeech also helps counter the other 
objection raised in section 2.2: that some kinds of ignorant speech—e.g., con-
spiracy theories—cannot be opposed in a positive way. The only way to counter 
them, it seemed, is to negate their content. However, doing so risks increasing 
their salience, and thereby exacerbating their damaging effects. 
The idea of preemptive counterspeech reveals a better response. The problem 
with these utterances is that, once they gain traction, it is difficult to oppose them 
in a way that does not backfire. To circumvent this difficulty, a more promising 
approach would be to preemptively condition the conversational context so that 
they never gain traction to begin with. Now, if the only way to do so were to 
preemptively deny ignorant propositions (“You may hear next week that Obama 
was born in Kenya. But rest assured: he was born in Hawaii”), one might worry 
that this strategy simply reproduces the initial problem: preemptive denial risks 
inadvertently reinforcing the salience of ignorant associations by repeating them. 
Crucially, however, one of the principal preemptive strategies outlined above 
involves casting doubt on the authority of speakers, rather than directly criticiz-
ing the content of their utterances. The recommendation that emerges from the 
diachronic understanding of counterspeech, then, is that we should preemptive-
ly warn people about, say, fake news sites spewing conspiracy theories. We can 
do this by preemptively identifying specific fake news sites as unreliable; or, al-
ternatively, by warning people that such unreliable sites exist and teaching them 
how to identify them. As we have seen, such warnings can drastically reduce 
the audience’s vulnerability to misinformation.79 So, diachronic counterspeech 
is doubly helpful: not only does it show how counterspeech might wholly fore-
stall the damaging effects of ignorant speech, but it also provides guidance for 
handling particularly resilient kinds of misinformation. 
It is important not to overstate the present section’s argument. I am not 
claiming that diachronic counterspeech will always be entirely successful at de-
fusing ignorant speech. Rather, in highlighting diachronic counterspeech, I am 
making a more restricted point: that, like legal remedies, counterspeech too can 
78 Cook, Lewandowsky, and Ecker, “Neutralizing Misinformation through Inoculation,” 15. 
79 Cook, Lewandowsky, and Ecker, “Neutralizing Misinformation through Inoculation,” 11–12. 
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in principle wholly defuse the harms of ignorant speech, and it can do so even in 
hard cases where positive counterspeech is unavailable. 
That counterspeech may not do this perfectly is a problem, but not a com-
parative problem. The objections raised in section 2.2 suggested that, insofar as 
legal remedies succeed in deterring ignorant speech, they can wholly eliminate the 
harms that such speech would otherwise have produced. The degree to which 
they are in fact successful, however, is limited. In their influential study of hate-
speech laws in Australia, for instance, Gelber and McNamara find that the enact-
ment of hate-speech laws did not reduce the incidence of verbal abuse.80 What 
this indicates is that, just as diachronic counterspeech is imperfect at disabling 
ignorant speech, so too legal remedies are imperfect at deterring ignorant speech. 
Thus, as stated, the objections in section 2.2 fail to provide a principled reason for 
preferring legal remedies to counterspeech. 
In what follows, after summarizing my broader argument, I will briefly ex-
amine what this means for the division of labor between legal and speech-based 
responses to ignorant speech.
4. Conclusion
Whether it takes the form of hate speech or of ordinary political misinformation, 
ignorant speech tends to be sticky. Because of the distinctive properties of con-
versational salience, the damaging effects of ignorant speech on conversational 
norms are typically easier to enact than to reverse. In fact, verbally countering 
ignorant speech may simply amplify its salience. 
Even so, I have argued that refining counterspeech along two dimensions can 
substantially mitigate this problem. First, we should distinguish between posi-
tive and negative forms of counterspeech. Instead of explicitly negating ignorant 
speech, positive counterspeech affirms a vision of the truth, which entails or im-
plicates the falsehood of the ignorant utterance without repeating it. Hence, pos-
itive counterspeech contradicts ignorant speech without magnifying its salience.
The emphasis on positive counterspeech nevertheless cannot fully address 
the problem at hand. Not all kinds of ignorant speech can be countered in a pos-
itive way. And, more fundamentally, even when positive counterspeech helps to 
80 Gelber and McNamara, “The Effects of Civil Hate Speech Laws,” 644–45. Moreover, while 
they do find that the language used to express prejudice in newspapers became tamer, this—
as Heinze observes—could simply be explained by hate speech taking a more coded form 
(Hate Speech in Democratic Citizenship, 145–48). For more general discussion of this prob-
lem, see Heinze, Hate Speech in Democratic Citizenship, 145–53; and Mchangama, Review of 
The Harm in Hate Speech, 97.
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reverse the conversational effects of ignorant speech, this may not change the 
fact that, before they were reversed, these effects generated harms. 
However, these remaining concerns rely on an unsophisticated understand-
ing of the temporality of counterspeech. One suggestion here is that counter-
speech might operate retroactively to prevent past ignorant utterances from ever 
constituting harmful speech acts. But even if we were to grant its theoretical 
viability, this suggestion is too narrowly focused on the harms constituted by 
ignorant speech to alleviate the above concern. The more decisive point, then, 
is that counterspeech should be understood diachronically, as an extended pro-
cess that can both preempt and follow ignorant utterances. Preemptive counter-
speech aims to condition the conversational context in a way that disables future 
ignorant utterances. By disarming ignorant speech before it is uttered, counter-
speech can wholly eliminate its attempted harms, causal and constitutive. More-
over, preemptive counterspeech prevents especially resilient forms of ignorance, 
which could not be countered positively, from taking root.
This, to reiterate, is not to say that counterspeech is infallible. Positive coun-
terparts to negative counterspeech can be difficult to find. Moreover, when an 
ignorant utterance has already taken root, preemptive counterspeech is no lon-
ger an option. And even when preemptive counterspeech remains an option, it 
is not foolproof. For instance, some speakers may be so authoritative that their 
verbal influence cannot fully be preemptively disabled. 
Nonetheless, the point remains that the refined conception of counterspeech 
is substantially more resilient in the face of sticky ignorance than it initially ap-
peared. Neither the fact that negating ignorant speech can reinforce its conver-
sational effects, nor the fact that the causal harms of ignorant speech cannot be 
reversed post hoc, suffice to show that counterspeech is inadequate.
Accordingly, while my argument does not preclude thinking that legal reme-
dies may sometimes be warranted to prevent sticky ignorant speech, it does es-
tablish that more needs to be said to justify such regulations. First and foremost, 
advocates of legal regulations need to provide more precise evidence of legal reg-
ulations’ deterrent effects. If legal regulations are to be defended as a response to 
the stickiness of ignorant speech, its proponents must (1) offer a more specific 
account of the contexts in which the refined conception of counterspeech fails, 
and (2) show that legal regulations could successfully deter ignorant speech in 
those contexts. For example, they might need to show that, in contexts where 
the ignorance-promoting speaker’s authority is so great that preemptive coun-
terspeech would struggle to disable her speech, legal regulations would by con-
trast succeed in deterring her utterance. This is a much more specific challenge 
than simply showing that legal regulations sometimes succeed in deterring hate 
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speech, and one that has yet to be met. Indeed, as is often observed, even more 
general evidence of the deterrent effect of legal regulations—i.e., evidence that 
legal regulations generally tend to deter hate speech—remains sparse.81
But that is not all. Even if legal regulations generally succeed in preventing 
ignorant speech in contexts that prove problematic for counterspeech, it must 
also be shown that, in the process of doing so, these regulations do not inadver-
tently amplify the salience of ignorant speech. In other words, it must be shown 
that legal regulations do not run afoul of the so-called Streisand effect, whereby 
attempting to hide or censor something unwittingly increases its publicity.82 
There are at least two reasons why, like negative counterspeech, legal regu-
lations might do so. First, given the powerful expressive force of laws, public-
ly enacting a law prohibiting, say, degrading speech, risks drawing the public’s 
attention to the fact that there are people who embrace and express degrading 
views.83 Second, the enforcement of speech-related legal restrictions often leads 
to highly publicized trials that put a spotlight on violators, their utterances, and 
the bad associations they promote. As Simpson notably observes, in the pres-
ence of hate-speech laws, the existence of hateful citizens and hateful ideologies 
is “powerfully conveyed in people’s preparedness to express their identity-based 
contempt even while faced with the threat or reality of prosecution.”84 What 
this underscores is that the process of implementing and enforcing laws that aim 
to deter ignorant speech may itself contribute to increasing the salience of such 
speech.
Accordingly, to establish that legal remedies are more effective ways than 
counterspeech of overcoming the problem of stickiness, proponents must estab-
lish not simply that their deterrent effect applies to the specific contexts where 
counterspeech fails, but also that the process of enacting and enforcing these 
laws will not amplify the salience of ignorant speech. 
In this light, developing a theoretically refined understanding of counter-
speech, whereby counterspeech is positively framed and extended over time, is 
beneficial in two respects: it offers guidance concerning how verbal responses 
to ignorant speech might succeed, notwithstanding its stickiness, and it clarifies 
81 See note 80 above.
82 I am grateful to a reviewer for pressing me on this point.
83 For discussion of the point that laws are expressively loud, see, e.g., McAdams, The Expres-
sive Powers of Law, 123.
84 Simpson, “Dignity, Harm, and Hate Speech,” 724. For a similar observation, see Heinze, 
“Hate Speech and the Normative Foundations of Regulation,” 599–600.
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the empirical challenge that must be met if we are to ascertain the correct divi-
sion of labor between counterspeech and legal remedies.85
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